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HJRBDICTION AND NATURE OF PRQfre^TMns
1.

Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals to hear

this appeal by Utah Code Ann., § 78-2a-3(2) (d) (1953, as amended).
2.

This appeal is from an Order of the Third Circuit Court, the

Honorable Michael L. Hutchings presiding, granting Plaintiff/Appellee's Motion for
Summary Judgment pursuant to which Motion Appellee sought enforcement of
Defendant/Appellant's drawer liability on a check.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

In light of the fact that Appellant failed to file in the Circuit Court

any memorandum of law or make any argument in opposition to Appellee's Motion for
Summary Judgment, may the Appellant now raise legal arguments for the first time on
appeal which should have been presented to the lower court? By failing to present
any legal argument to the lower court, Appellant failed to preserve for appeal the
issues submitted to this Court as alleged errors of the lower court. Zions First Nat'l
Bank v. Nat'l Am. Title Ins.. 749 P.2d 651 (Utah 1988).
2.

Did the affidavits, filed by Appellant in response to Appellee's

Motion for Summary Judgment, raise a genuine issue as to a material fact which could
have precluded the lower court from finding that Appellee took the check for value,
acted in good faith and without notice of defenses at the time it took Appellants's
check, and was therefore entitled to holder in due course status? Appellee's Motion
for Summary Judgment was granted by the lower court as a matter of law and is
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therefore subject to review for correctness. Barber v. Farmers Ins. Exch.. 751 P.2d 248
(UtahApp. 1988).
3.

Did the affidavits filed by Appellant in opposition to Appellee's

Motion for Summary Judgment, raise a genuine issue as to any material fact as to the
existence of a defense to the check which would have precluded Appellee as a holder,
from enforcing Appellant's drawer liability? Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment
was granted by the lower court as a matter of law and is therefore subject to review
for correctness. Barber v. Farmers Ins. Exch.. 751 P.2d 248 (Utah App. 1988).
DETERMINATIVE RULES AND STATUTES

Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
[c] Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be
served at least 10 days before the time affixed for the
hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may
serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment,
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of
liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the
amount of damages.
Rule 4-501, Utah Code of Judicial Administration:
(2) Motions for summary judgment.
(a) Memorandum in support of motion. The points and
authorities in support of a motion for summary judgment
shall begin with a section that contains a concise statement
of material facts as to which movant contends no genuine
issue exists. The facts shall be stated in separate numbered
sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions of
the record upon which the movant relies.
00021377.L96
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(b) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and
authorities in opposition to a motion for summary judgment
shall begin with a section that contains a concise statement
of material facts as to which the party contends a genuine
issue exists. Each disputed fact shall be stated in separate
numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those
portions of the record upon which the opposing party relies,
and if applicable, shall state the numbered sentence or
sentences of the movant's facts that are disputed. All
material facts set forth in the movant's statement and
properly supported by an accurate reference to the record
shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of summary
judgment unless specifically controverted by the opposing
party's statement.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The underlying law suit is one for collection against the drawer of a
check pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-414(2) (1993), deposited by a bank
customer which did not clear Appellant was the drawer of a $9,000.00 check made
payable to Aristocrat Travel as payee. The check was drawn on Appellant's account
at First Security Bank. Aristocrat Travel deposited Appellant's check in its account
with Appellee. Appellee allowed Aristocrat Travel to draw on uncollected funds.
Thereafter, Appellant's check was returned to Appellee by First Security Bank due to
insufficient funds in Appellant's account. Appellee's action was commenced by the
filing of a Complaint on August 2, 1995. (R. 1.) Pursuant to its Complaint, Appellee, as
holder and holder in due course of a check, sought recovery from Appellant as the
drawer thereof. (R. 1.) On August 14, 1995, Appellant filed an unverified Answer
which included no affirmative defenses or counterclaims. (R.10)
Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment was filed on August 31, 1995.
(R. 13) That Motion was supported by a memorandum of law (R. 15) and a supporting
00021377ii96
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affidavit (R. 28)1. On September 14, 1995, Appellant filed two affidavits in opposition to
the Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 40 and 42). Appellant filed no memorandum in
opposition to Plaintiff's Motion and did not request a hearing.
Appellee filed a reply Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support
of its Motion for Summary Judgment and submitted the matter for decision on
September 14, 1995 (R. 44 and 52). The Motion for Summary Judgment was granted
by the Third Circuit Court on September 28, 1995 (R. 58).

APPELLEE'S REBUTTAL TO APPELLANT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS,
Appellant has prepared a Statement of Facts which is not supported by
any record references. This is in violation of Rule 24(a)(7) and (e), Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure. Therefore, the Appellant's Statement of Facts should be
disregarded.
Further, an examination of Appellant's Statement of Facts reveals that the
lack of references to the record is due to the fact that the allegations made therein are
absolutely unsupported, and, in fact, contradicted by the record below. Specifically,
Appellee would bring to the Court's attention the following allegations of Appellant's
Statement of Facts:

1

Due to the many references to the Affidavit of Deanne Freeman in support of
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, a courtesy copy is attached hereto as an
Addendum.
00021377.L96
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1.

'The check . . . was meant to purchase ownership in the

company." (Page 5, two lines from bottom.)2 There is no evidence in the record to
support for this allegation.
2.

"... Bank One credited Aristocrat's account for $9,000.00 but did

not allow Aristocrat to immediately withdraw funds in the amount of the check." (Page
6,1. 5.) This allegation is unsupported by the record and, in fact, is contradicted by
the Affidavit of Deanne Freeman (R. 35, see Addendum) which reflects that Appellant's
check was deposited in Aristocrat's account with Appellee on May 25, 1995, and the
balance of the account was withdrawn by Aristocrat on May 26, 1995.
3.

"On May 30, 1995 . . . Bank One allowed Aristocrat to make a

withdrawal in the amount of the check." (Page 6, line 7.) The only information in the
record which discusses withdrawal by Aristocrat of monies from its account are in R.
35, see Addendum, and reflects that the sums in the account were withdrawn on May
26, 1995.
4.

"That very same day [May 30, 1995, the date of the notice of

insufficient funds] . . . [R]ather than immediately debiting $9,000.00 from Aristocrat's
account, Bank One continued to credit the account in the amount of Herwit's check."
(P. 6,11. 8-12.) The only record reference to the actions of the Appellee after receipt of
the notice of insufficient funds establishes that the account was charged back on May

2

References in this rebuttal are references to page and line numbers of
Appellant's Brief.
00021377.L96
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31, 199S and there was no "continuing credit" for the amount of Appellant's check. (R.
35, see Addendum.)
5.

"Aristocrat subsequently became insolvent and filed for

bankruptcy." (P. 6,1. 17.) There is nothing in the record which supports this
allegation.
6.

At page 10 of his brief, Appellant quotes to the court certain

language and refers to paragraph 6 and 7 of the Affidavit of Francee Jolley as support
therefore. The quoted language does not appear in the Affidavit of Francee Jolley and
that Affidavit does not even contain paragraphs numbered 6 or 7.
7.

Appellant makes reference in his brief, on numerous occasions, to

normal commercial banking practices. Instances follow:
a.

"Had Bank One properly waited for the check to clear, as

the normal commercial practice clearly calls for . . .." (P. 11,1. 17.)
b.

"The prescribed commercial practice in this instance would

have been to . . . " (P. 11,1. 22.)
c.

"Had Bank One observed the normal practice of. . .." (P.

d.

"Similarly, Bank One's failure in the instant case to twice

12,1. 3.)

follow prescribed commercial practice for ...." (P. 13,1. 5.)
The record before the lower court reveals no evidence whatsoever
regarding "normal" commercial practices.
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Based on all of the foregoing, Appellee respectfully requests that the
Appellant's factual allegations should be disregarded by the Court and the Court's
review of this matter should be based upon Appellee's summary and statement of
relevant facts set forth below, all of which are supported by record references.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Appellant is, or was a customer of First Security Bank at which

institution he maintained a checking account. (R. 2, 6, 15, 27, and 33).
2.

On May 19, 1995, Appellant drew check number 2526 on his

account at First Security Bank in the amount of $9,000.00 made payable to the order of
"Aristocrat." (R. 15, 16, 27, 33, and 40.)
3.

On May 25, 1995, check number 2526 was deposited by Aristocrat

Travel and Cruises of Park City, Inc. to its account at Bank One, Utah. (R. 29 at H 4;
33; and 35; see Addendum3.)
4.

"Aristocrat," the payee of check number 2526, withdrew from its

account at Bank One, Utah on May 26, 1995, the entire contents thereof in the sum of
$16,071.40 including the credit given for check number 2526. (R. 35 ninth line from
bottom of page; and R. 29 at 11 6, see Addendum.)

3

The Appellant contends in his Affidavit in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion that
the instrument was deposited on May 26, 1995. This dispute is irrelevant. However, an
examination of the reverse side of check number 2526 (R. 6) bears the dated deposit
stamp reflecting a deposit date of May 25, 1995. Similarly, the account statements
submitted into evidence through the affidavit of Deanne Freeman (R. 35) also
corroborates a deposit date of May 25, 1995.
00021377.L96
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8.

Four days later, on May 30, 1995, First Security Bank, the drawee

of check number 2526, dishonored the instrument as a result of insufficient funds and
returned it to Bank One. (R 42 at H 5; and R 29 at H 7, see Addendum.)
6.

On May 31, 1995, Bank One, Utah, charged back the sum of

$9,000.00 against the account of the payee, Aristocrat Travel as well as a return check
charge. (R 29 at H 6; and R 35fifthline from bottom, see Addendum.)
7.

As a result of the fact that Aristocrat Travel had already withdrawn

the balance of the account, this charge back resulted in a negative balance in said
entity's account in the amount of $9,346.06 as of May 31, 1995. (R. 29 at 11 6; and R
35, see Addendum.)
8.

Bank One's notice that check number 2526 would not be honored

by the drawee, First Security Bank was received on or about May 31, 1995 (R. 29 at H
7, see Addendum), five days after the payee had withdrawn all funds in its account. (R
35 nine lines from bottom.)
9.

Appellant asserts in his affidavit that the instrument was deposited

by the payee, at Bank One, Utah, on May 26, 1995 (R 40 at 11 4).
10.

Appellant alleges that at some date "thereafter" (after May 26,

1995) and continuing for two months, he had communications with Bank One, Utah,
which communications would constitute "notice" to Bank One, Utah that check number
2526 would not clear. (R. 41 at H 5.)

00021377.L96
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11.

The affidavit of Francee Jolley, an officer of First Security Bank, the

drawee, establishes that no notice was given by First Security Bank to Bank One as to
the insufficiency of funds until, at the earliest, May 30, 1995. (R. 42.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

Appellant did not plead any affirmative defenses in his unverified

answer. Appellant did not raise any defenses by way of subsequent motions, did not
file any memorandum in opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment; and, did not
request a hearing. Appellant now raises legal arguments on appeal, for the first time,
that Bank One had some sort of notice, at the time it took the instrument in question,
that should have precluded the lower court from concluding that Bank One acted in
good faith and without notice at the time it took the instrument. These arguments
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal and therefore the lower court's ruling
should be affirmed.
2.

Appellant argues that affidavits filed in opposition to the underlying

Motion for Summary Judgment raise a question of fact with regard to whether Bank
One had some notice which should have precluded the lower court from concluding
that Bank One acted in good faith and without notice in taking the instrument in
question. If Bank One had prior notice it would not be able to enforce the instrument
as a holder in due course and therefore, free of any defenses which Appellant may
assert to the instrument. However, under Utah law notice and good faith are to be
measured at the time the instrument is taken. It is undisputed that Bank One took the
instrument on May 25, 1995, and gave value therefore on May 26, 1995. Appellant's
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own affidavits establish that no notice was given to Bank One of any infirmity in the
instrument until after May 26, 1995. Consequently, Bank One's status as a holder in
due course is established as a matter of law and the lower court's ruling should be
affirmed.
3.

Alternatively, Appellant appears to argue that Bank One did not act

in good faith and is therefore not a holder in due course because it failed to mitigate
its damages by promptly charging back the account of the payee Aristocrat Travel.
This allegation is simply untrue and unsupported by the record. The record
establishes that the check was deposited by the payee on May 25, 1995 and the funds
withdrawn on May 26, 1995. There is nothing in the record to suggest that Appellee
had any notice prior to May 26, 1995 on which it could have based any decision to
earlier charge back the account of the payee. Further, Aristocrat Travel's account
was charged back immediately after receipt of the notice from First Security Bank that
Appellant had insufficient funds in his account. (R. 29 at 11 6; and R. 35, see
Addendum.) Finally, this defense (failure to mitigate damages) was not raised by
Appellant either by answer or subsequent motion. Again, the lower court's ruling is
well supported and should be affirmed.
4.

The status of Bank One as a holder need only be reached by this

Court in the event Bank One is deemed not to be a holder in due course. Even if Bank
One is only a holder, it may still enforce the check subject to defenses properly raised
by Appellant. Appellant did not raise any defenses by way of answer or subsequent
motion. It is somewhat unclear what defenses Appellant is attempting to raise now, for
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the first time on appeal. However, it seems that Appellant is attempting to raise lack of
consideration as a defense. This is predicated on his argument that the check was
written to purchase an equity position in Aristocrat Travel, the payee. Appellant argues
that he received nothing for his money because that entity subsequently went bankrupt.
The purpose for which the check was written is not in the record nor is the present
status of the payee, Aristocrat Travel. Even if these "facts" were in the record, they
would be irrelevant. These facts would only be relevant to the wisdom of the
Appellant's purchase, not to the legal sufficiency of the consideration. Finally, lack of
consideration was not raised by way of answer or subsequent motion. As there is no
evidence in the record of any defense, the lower court properly held that Bank One
could enforce the check as a holder, and this ruling should be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
HERWTT CANNOT RAISE FOR THE FIRST TIME ON
APPEAL ISSUES AND ARGUMENTS WHICH SHOULD
HAVE BEEN RAISED BEFORE THE LOWER COURT

Two of the elements of holder in due course status are that the holder
takes an instrument in good faith and without notice of certain enumerated defects.
Herwit now argues that Bank One had certain notice which should have precluded the
lower court from determining that the instrument in question was taken in good faith
and without notice. Herwit also argues that he has certain defenses to the underlying
instrument which defenses can be raised against Bank One in the event Bank One is
determined to be a mere holder. These legal arguments and defenses were not made
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in any pleading before the lower court and cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal.
By way of his answer, Herwit raised no affirmative defenses. (R. 10.)
Herwit's answer is unverified and therefore, under Utah law, the allegations appearing
in dicta therein may not be considered in opposing a motion for summary judgment.
OJnited Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Willev. 444 P.2d 7S5 (Utah 1968); Freed Fin. Co. v. Stoker
Motor Co.. 537 P.2d 1039 (Utah 1975); and Hall v. Fitzgerald. 671 P.2d 224 (Utah
1983).)
Likewise, Herwit failed to raise defenses by subsequent motion and failed
to submit a memorandum containing any legal argument to the court in opposition to
the underlying Motion for Summary Judgment. As a result, Herwit has failed to
preserve any issue for appeal. "With limited exceptions, the practice of this court has
been to decline consideration of issues raised for the first time on appeal." Espinal v.
Salt Lake City Bd. Of Educ. 797 P.2d 412, 413 (Utah 1990).
This standard has also been applied in the summary judgment context in
the case of Banaerter v. Poulton. 663 P.2d 100 (Utah 1983). In addressing arguments
made in an appellant's brief which arguments had not been made to the lower court,
the Utah Supreme Court stated as follows:
Plaintiffs in their brief suggest that fraud and illegality,
though not specifically pleaded, actually existed, and that
they should be allowed to pursue these defenses through
additional discovery. It is axiomatic that defenses and
claims not raised by the parties in the trial court cannot be
considered for the first time on appeal.
Id. at 102.
00021377.L96
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This rule applies with equal force even in those situations in which the
matter being reviewed is a question of law. This was made clear in the case of Zions
First Nat'l Bank v, Nat'l Am. Title Ins., 749 P.2d 651 (Utah 1988), in which case the Utah
Supreme Court addressed the policy behind the rule.
National American's third claim on appeal is that an agency
relationship existed between Jeffery Olson and Zions and
that as a result, Jeffery's knowledge of the forgery should
be imputed to Zions. This claim has been raised on appeal
for the first time, generally we do not consider issues that
were not presented to the trial court
Id. at 654.
The Utah Supreme Court went on to make it clear that this applied even
to questions of law.
Because we do not defer to trial court's determinations of
legal questions, National American contends that we are as
well situated as the trial court to deal with the issue.
National American's position ignores one of the reasons for
refusing to consider any matter for the first time on appeal,
even a matter of law. Although we may not defer to a trial
court's conclusions on a legal question, we certainly may
derive great benefit from the trial judge's views on the
issue and may be persuaded by those views. This provides
ample justification for refusing to consider National
American's claim.
Id
Had Herwit, articulated his arguments before the trial court concerning
good faith, notice, mitigation of damages, and lack of consideration, Bank One would
have had an opportunity to respond thereto. The trial court would have had an
opportunity to review the arguments and this Court would have the benefit of a
complete record on those issues. Herwit, cannot forego his opportunity to bring these
00021377.L96
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issues to the attention of the trial court and then be permitted to base an appeal
thereon. This Court should therefore disregard Herwit's claims of error and affirm the
trial court's ruling.
POINT n
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS PROPER WHEN THERE IS NO
GENUINE ISSUE AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT

The standard for entry of summary judgment as set forth in
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, reads in relevant part as follows:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
[Emphasis added.]
Utah case law makes it clear that Rule 56 requires two (2) separate
inquiries. There must be a genuine issue of fact to be resolved by the trier-of-fact.
Further, the disputed fact must be material to the outcome of the action. The
foregoing rule does not preclude summary judgment simply whenever some fact
remains in dispute, but only when a material fact is genuinely controverted." Healar
Ranch. Inc. v. Stillman. 619 P.2d 1390, 1391 (Utah 1980). If this Court considers
Herwit's alleged defenses, which are raised for the first time on appeal, there is no
dispute of any material fact relevant to Bank One's right to summary judgment. It is
undisputed that Herwit drew a check on his account at First Security Bank made
payable to the order of Aristocrat Travel. It is undisputed that Aristocrat Travel
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deposited that check to its account with Bank One, on May 25, 1995 and withdrew the
funds so deposited on May 26, 1995.
The only issues are: (1) Whether Bank One had some notice, at the time
it took the instrument in question which would preclude it from enforcing the
instrument as a holder in due course; and (2) if Bank One is only a holder, are there
any material issues demonstrating that Herwit has real defenses to enforcement. The
only material filed by the Herwit in opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment is
in the form of two affidavits, neither of which raise a relevant question of material fact
on these issues. Thus, without material issues of fact, summary judgment in Bank
One's favor was appropriate and this ruling should be affirmed.
POINT DI
THE CIRCUIT COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT
HERWIT DID NOT RAISE ANY ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT
RELEVANT TO BANK ONE'S STATUS AS A HOLDER IN
DUE COURSE

It is undisputed that Herwit is the drawer of a check which instrument
was subsequently dishonored. It is undisputed that Herwit's liability as drawer may be
enforced by any holder. Utah Code Ann., § 70A-3-301 (1953 as amended). It is
undisputed that Bank One is a holder of the check. If Bank One is a holder in due
course (§ 70A-3-302), Herwit's liability is absolute as he has no defenses against Bank
One (§ 70A-3-305(2)). If Bank One is only a holder, then it may still enforce the
instrument if there are no real defenses precluding enforcement. The first issue to be
considered by this Court is whether Bank One is the holder in due course (hereinafter
"HDC"). If not, and Bank One is merely a holder, then this Court must decide whether
00021377.L96
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Herwit has raised any material facts which support defenses to enforcement. (See
Point IV.)
There are three criteria for determining whether Bank One was a HDC.
Those are that the instrument must be taken (1) for value, (2) in good faith, and (3)
without notice that it is overdue or had been dishonored or of any defense against it.
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-302Q). If all of these criteria are met, then Bank One can
enforce the instrument free from all Herwit's defenses. (§ 70A-3-305, 306.)
A.

Bank One gave "value" for Herwit's check.

It is undisputed that after Herwit's check for $9,000.00 was deposited by
Aristocrat Travel with Bank One, Bank One gave full value one day later. Value was
give when Aristocrat Travel was allowed to draw on uncollected funds, which it
accomplished by withdrawing the entire balance of its account, $16,071.40, on May 26,
1995. (R. 35; and R. 29, see Addendum.) As earlier stated, Herwit's argument that
Bank One "continued to allow drawings" after notice is totally unsupported. Value was
given all at one time on May 26, 1995. This will be an important distinction when
considering the element of "notice," discussed below. Thus, Bank One has met the
first criteria of HDC status.
B. Bank One acted in "good faith"
Herwit makes three arguments that there is a question of fact on whether
Bank One acted in "good faith." First, Herwit argues that when Bank One immediately
allowed Aristocrat Travel to draw monies against the deposited funds, that Bank One
failed to follow "prescribed commercial practices" and this is lack of good faith.
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Second, Herwit argues that Bank One's failure to immediately debit Aristocrat Travel's
account after notice of insufficient fiinds is lack of good faith. Third, Herwit argues that
Bank One did not act in good faith because it continued to allow Aristocrat Travel to
draw on the uncollected funds after notice of insufficient funds. As is shown below, all
of these arguments are without merit, either because the undisputed facts contradict
the arguments, or there is no legal support for them. Therefore, there is no material
issue of fact on the "good faith" element of Bank One's HDC status.
1.

Allowing immediate credit on uncollected funds on deposit
is not a lack of "good faith."

Contrary to Herwit's citation of the definition of good faith, the correct
statutory definition is " 'good faith' means honesty in fact in the conduct or
transaction concerned." Utah Code Ann., § 70A-3-103(l)(d) (1993). This criteria has
been defined as a purely subjective test. However, Herwit argues that the test is an
objective one, i.e., did Bank One follow "prescribed commercial practices?" However,
Herwit's proposed standard has repeatedly been held to not be the test for
determining "good faith." Rather, the test is one of:
[H]onesty and good faith, and not by a speculative issue as
to his diligence or negligence. The rights of a holder
cannot be defeated without proof of actual notice or bad
faith on his part. In short, the holder is deemed to take the
instrument in good faith if he takes it with a complete
absence of knowledge; he is normally under no affirmative
duty to ascertain the facts that induced the instrument
before he takes it."
Henry J. Bailey and Richard B. Hagedorn, Brady on Bank Checks, 8-15 (7th ed. 1992).
This commentator goes on further to state :
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The subjective test of good faith has been applied where a
bank takes a check on deposit that is drawn on a different
bank and permits the depositor to draw against the check
before it has been collected. In other words, where a
depository bank permits a drawing against uncollected
funds, lack of good faith is not indicated on the part of that
bank.
Id. at pp. 8-20. This position is the near unanimous position of courts which have
considered this issue. See Valley Bank of Nevada v. TER Management Corp.. 719 P.2d
301, 306 (Ariz. App. 1986); Vail Nat'l Bank v. T. Wheeler Construction Corp.. 669 P.2d
1038, 1040 (Colo. App. 1983); and Frantz v. First Nat'l Bank of Anchorage. 584 P.2d
1125, 1127 (Alaska 1978). In fact, the purpose of the HDC rule is to promote
commerce and encourage banks to immediately provide credit on deposited items.
Frantz. supra.: Exchange Nat'l Bank of Winterhaven v. Beshara. 236 So. 2d 198, 201
(Fla. App. 1970); Citizens Nat'l Banks of Anglewood v. Fort Lee Saving & Loan Assoc.
213 A.2d 315, 319 (N.J. 1965); see also Bakley Clark, The Law of Bank Deposits,
Collections, and Credit Cards, 2-3 (rev. ed. 1995).
Thus, Herwit's argument that there was no good faith because Bank One
immediately allowed a withdrawal of uncollected funds is totally without merit and does
not create a question of fact.
2. Bank One did immediately debit its customer's account
Contrary to Herwit's argument that "Bank One waited around two months
maintaining the unwarranted hope that the closing on Herwit's condo would go
through" (Herwit's brief at p. 12), the undisputed facts clearly demonstrate that Bank
One debited Aristocrat's account the very day it received notice that Herwit's check
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would not clear. An examination of Aristocrat's account statement attached to the
Affidavit ol Deanne Freeman, Bank One's customer service manager (R.35, see
Addendum), shows that Herwit's check was deposited May 25, 1995; that Aristocrat
withdrew those funds on May 26, 1995; and Bank One charged Aristocrat's account for
a $9,000.00 "returned item" on May 31, 1995. This is consistent with the Affidavit of
Francee Jolley, Operations Manager of First Security Bank, Herwit's bank, that
Herwit's check was presented to First Security Bank on May 30, 1995 and returned
that day due to insufficient funds. (R. 42.)
Thus, Herwit's factual basis for arguing lack of good faith (i.e., failure to
immediately debit Aristocrat's account) is non-existent. Further, there is no legal
support for this argument as the examination of Bank One's "good faith" is at the time
of the taking of Herwit's check, not what it did subsequently. Valley Bank of Nev..
supra, at 306; and Citv of Phoenix v. Great Western Bank & Trust. 712 P.2d 966, 971,
(Ariz. App. 1985). Also, Bank One has no obligation to charge back its customer's
account in order to pursue its claims against Herwit. See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-4214(5); Nations Bank of Virginia. N A v. Cookies. Inc.r (Va. Cir. Ct. 1993) 22 U.C.C.
Eep, 2d 838.
3.

Bank One did not allow continuing credits on uncollected
funds after Herwit's check was returned for insufficient
funds.

Again, contrary to Herwit's unsupported assertions that Bank One
"continued to credit" Aristocrat's account after learning of the NSF status of Herwit's
check (Herwit's brief at pp. 6 and 12), Bank One did not allow such continuing
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credits. As set forth in the Statement of Facts, Herwit's check was deposited on May
25, 1995; was drawn against in full on May 26, 1995; was returned marked "NSF" by
Herwit's bank on May 30, 1995; and the account was charged back on May 31, 1995.
Thus, Herwit's allegation of lack of good faith on this basis is meritless.
C. Bank One acted without notice of any defects.
The third requirement for HDC status is that the holder takes the
instrument for value in good faith and without notice of any defects in the instrument.
Utah Code Ann., § 70A-3-302(b) (1953 as amended). This section reads, in relevant
part, as follows:
(1) Subject to subsection (3) and subsection 70A-3-106(4),
"holder in due course" means the holder of an instrument if:
(b) the holder took the instrument for value, in good faith,
without notice that the instrument was overdue or has been
dishonored or that there is an uncured default with respect
to payment of another instrument issued as part of the same
series, without notice that the instrument contains an
unauthorized signature or has been altered, without notice
of any claim to the instrument described in section 70A-3306, and without notice that any party has a defense or
claim in recoupment described in subsection 70A-3-305(l).
Herwit argues that there is evidence in the record that should have
precluded the circuit court from finding that Bank One acted in good faith and without
notice at the time it took the instrument. Herwit's affidavits raised no such issue of
fact.
First, it is essential to keep in mind the precise language of § 70A-3-302,
which begins with the following language, "the holder took the instrument... in good
faith, without notice . .." [emphasis added]. If the requirement is that a holder take an
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instrument without notice and in good faith, the only notice which would be relevant
would be notice that the holder had at the time of the taking. "To be effective, notice
must be received at a time and in a manner that gives a reasonable opportunity to act
on it." Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-302(6) (1993).
It is undisputed in this case that Bank One took the instrument on May 25,
1995, and gave value therefore on May 26, 1995. This is established by the Affidavit of
Deanne Freeman, the instrument itself, and the account statement submitted into
evidence through Ms. Freeman's Affidavit. (R. 28-37; see Addendum). Thus, the issue
is whether the affidavits filed by Herwit contain sufficient facts to establish that Bank
One had some notice of the insufficiency of the funds on which the instrument was
drawn prior to May 26, 1998. Herwit's affidavits do not allege such a fact. Herwit
appears to argue that Bank One is imputed with the knowledge of its depositor, or
immediate prior transfer. Herwit alleges through his affidavit that when he delivered
the check to the payee on May 25, 1995, he advised payee Aristocrat Travel, that the
check would not clear (R 40). That entities' knowledge cannot be imputed to Bank
One. See definition of "notice" received, Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1-201 (26)(b) (1993).
The concept of HDC was specifically developed to protect a bank in this
situation. The official comments to § 3-305, U.C.C., makes it clear that a holder does
not lose its HDC status based upon notice to its immediate prior transferee.
If buyer issues an instrument to seller and buyer has a
defense against seller, that defense can obviously be
asserted. Buyer and seller are the only people involved.
The holder-in-due-course doctrine has no relevance. The
doctrine applies only in cases in which more than two
parties are involved. Its essence is that the holder-in-due00021377.L96
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course does not have to suffer the consequences of a
defense of the obligor on the instrument that arose from an
occurrence of a third party. [Emphasis added.]
Commercial and Debtor/Creditor Law, selected statutes 1995 ed. Foundation Press, §
3-305, p. 333, comment 2.
Herwit next alleges that he believed the check was deposited on May 26,
1995, and that sometime thereafter he spoke with officers of Bank One concerning the
insufficiency of funds in his account to cover the check. (CR. 40 and 41 at f 4 and 5.)
As previously pointed out and as supported by the record, Bank One had
already given value for the check and the funds had been withdrawn from Bank One,
Utah by Aristocrat Travel, on May 26, 1995. Any notice provided after May 26, 1995
would not have any effect on Bank One's HDC status since it no longer had an
opportunity to act thereon. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-302(6) (1993).
Finally, in paragraph 6 of his affidavit, Herwit alleges that "from the date
the plaintiff received defendant's check to the present, plaintiff knew that the check
would not clear defendant's bank." (R. 41 at H 6.) This allegation is purely
conclusory and is unsupported by any underlying facts. It contains no specifics as to
who, when, and where the alleged notice was provided. As such, it is insufficient to
defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. Walker v. Rocky Mt.
Recreation Corp.. 508 P.2d 538 (Utah 1973); Williams v. Melbv. 679 P.2d 723 (Utah
1985); Norton v. Blackham. 669 P.2d 857 (Utah 1983); and Treloaaan v. Treloaaan. 699
P.2d 747 (Utah 1985). In fact, this conclusory allegation is actually controverted by the
other allegations of Herwit's Affidavit in which he claims he only gave notice sometime
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after May 26, 1995, (R.41) and by the second Affidavit filed by Herwit, the affidavit of
Francee Jolley. The Affidavit of Francee Jolley, an officer of the drawee bank, First
Security Bank, establishes that the check was returned to Bank One on May 30, 1995
(R.42). This is five days after the instrument was taken and four days after value was
given. Again, there are no facts in the record which would raise a dispute as to
whether Bank One had any notice at the time it took the instrument and gave value
therefore.
As a result, it cannot be said that the lower court committed an error of
law if it concluded that Bank One took the instrument in good faith, without notice, and
therefore is entitled to HDC status.
In his brief (p. 10) Herwit argues that the Affidavit of Francee Jolley
contains the following language:
I never had a conversation with anyone that First Security
Bank would honor the foregoing check. In fact, the check
was not honored nor has it ever been honored. As
operations manager, I would be aware as to whether
anyone in our office would have either honored the check
or stated to any party that the check was honored. I have
discussed the matter with the branch manager. It is against
bank policy to honor a check received the way Mr.
Herwit's was received. Neither the branch manager or me
ever honored the foregoing check nor did we state to
anyone that the check would be honored in fact the check
was dishonored on May 30, 1995 and returned that day to
Bank One.
Even if this material appeared in the affidavit of Francee Jolley it would be
irrelevant. It would only establish notice which Bank One did not have. It does not
establish that Bank One had any notice. However, and more importantly, this material
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cited by Herwit does not appear in the affidavit of Francee Jolley. If an affidavit
containing this material exists, it was never filed with the Third Circuit Court or
provided to Bank One's counsel. In alleging that this material appears in the affidavit
of Francee Jolley, Herwit is taking serious liberties with the record herein.
Herwit relies on the case of Seinfeld v. Commercial Bank and Trust Co..
405 So.2d 1029 (Fla. App. 3 Dist. 1981). This case can be distinguished from the case
before this Court. Herwit argues in his brief (p. 12) that the Seinfeld case involves
checks on which a depository bank paid, and "then continued to credit the payee's
account after the checks were returned for insufficient funds." This clearly
distinguishes it from the case before this Court.
All evidence in the record establishes that the check in question was
returned for insufficient funds on May 30, 1995 and received by Bank One on May 31,
1995. Bank One did not continue to credit the payee's account thereafter for the
$9,000.00. All funds had been withdrawn from that account on May 26, 1995.4 This is
established by the account statements which were submitted to the lower court
through the affidavit of Deanne Freeman. (R. 35, see Addendum.) Bank One charged
back the payee's account upon receipt of the returned item, however, this only
resulted in an overdraft in excess of $9,000.00. Herwit's affidavits do not raise a
genuine issue as to any material fact pertaining to notice which Bank One may have

4

The law clearly provides for application of afirstin-first out rule. Utah Code
Ann. § 70A-4-210(2) (1993).
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had at the time it took and gave value for the instrument in question and therefore, the
lower court committed no reversible error.
Further, it should be noted that Seinfeld is a single contrary case from a
court in south Florida which is treated as an aberation by respected treatises which
have refered to the Florida court as having H.. .acted with possibly unreasonable
strictness against a bank . . .H and which go on to describe the holding in the Seinfeld
case as one which ".. .appears contrary to other cases ...." Henry J. Bailey and
Richard B. Hagedorn, Brady on Bank Checks, 8-23; and 8-46 (7th ed. 1992). The
holding in Seinfeld is certainly contrary to Utah law which, as cited earlier makes it
perfectly clear that good faith is to be measured at the time of the "taking11 of an
instrument.
In summary, Bank One has clearly demonstrated a prima facie case for
HDC status. There was no evidence submitted by Herwit demonstrating material
issues of fact on whether Bank One, (1) failed to give value, (2) lacked good faith, or
(3) had prior notice of defenses. To the contrary, all the evidence indicates that Bank
One is an HDC and entitled to enforce the check against Herwit on his drawer's
liability. Therefore, this Court should affirm the trial court's grant of summary
judgment.9

8

This case is nearly identical to First America Bank-Northeast Illinois. N A v.
Bocian. 614 N.E. 2d 890 (HI. App. 2d dist. 1993). The Illinois court reviewed the
Uniform Commercial Code - negotiable Instruments and substantial case law and held
that summary judgment was appropriate in allowing the bank as a HDC to enforce the
check against the drawer.
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POINT IV
THE CIRCUIT COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT
HERWTPS AFFIDAVITS FAILED TO RAISE ANY
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE WHICH WOULD PRECLUDE
ENFORCEMENT OF THE CHECK BY BANK ONE AS A
HOLDER.
Bank One's right to enforce check number 2526 as a holder, subject to
defenses properly raised by Herwit, is an issue which need only be raised if Bank One
is not an HDC. In the event Bank One is a mere holder of the instrument, Bank One
takes the instrument subject to any contract defenses Herwit may have to the
instrument, lltah Code Ann. § 70A-3-305 (1953 as amended).6

8

Herwit, at page 14 of his brief, cites to the Court the language of the above cited
section as it appeared by prior enactment which was repealed and re-codified in 1993.
The language of the current applicable section is as follows:
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2) the right to
enforce the obligation of a party to pay an instrument
is subject to the following: (b) a defense of the
obligor stated in another section of this chapter or a
defense of the obligor that would be available if the
person entitled to enforce the instrument were
enforcing a right to payment under a simple contract;
and (c)(i) a claim in recoupment of the obligor
against the original payee of the instrument if the
claim arose from the transaction that gave rise to the
transaction; (ii) but the claim of the obligor may be
asserted against a transferee of the instrument only to
reduce the amount owing on the instrument at the
time the action is brought.
(2) The right of a holder in due course to enforce
the obligation of a party to pay the instrument is
subject to defenses of the obligor stated in
subsection (l)(a), but is not subject to defenses of
the obligor stated in subsection (l)(b) or claims in
recoupment stated in subsection (l)(c) against a
00021377 .L96
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Herwit alleges that he has two affirmative defenses to enforcement of
check number 2526. Those are conditional delivery/delivery for a special purpose and
failure of consideration. Neither of these defenses are available to Herwit as they are
affirmative defenses which, pursuant to Rule 12, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, are
waived if not raised by answer.
Rule 12(h), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, reads in relevant part as
follows:
A party waives all defenses and objections which he does
not present either by motion as hereinbefore provided or, if
he has made no motion, in his answer or reply . . ..
Herwit has filed no motions in this action raising any defenses. Herwit
raised no affirmative defenses by way of answer. The defenses on which Herwit relies
in this appeal are affirmative defenses which were waived due to Herwit's failure to
properly raise them below.
In Gill v. Timm. 720 P.2d 1352 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court
stated that affirmative defenses must be revised in the answer. In Gill, a party
attempted to raise failure to mitigate damages as an argument on appeal. The Utah
Supreme Court rejected this argument stating:
"Mitigation of damages is an affirmative defense." [Citation
omitted.] Affirmative defenses must be set forth in
responsive pleadings, Utah R Civ. P. 8(c), and are usually
waived if not so pleaded. Utah R. Civ. P. 12(h). This court
has explained the reason for this result: since an affirmative
defense raises matters outside of the scope of plaintiff's
prima facie case, any matter which does not tend to

person other than the holder.
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controvert the opposing party's prima facie case should be
pleaded and is not put in issue by denial pursuant to Rule
8(b) [Utah R Civ. P.].
Id at 1353-54.
It is clear under Utah law that Bank One made out its prima facie case. A
prima facie case for enforcement of a negotiable instrument is defined at § 70A-3-308,
which reads in relevant part as follows:
(1) In an action with respect to an instrument, the
authenticity of, and authority to make each signature on the
instrument is admitted unless specifically denied in the
pleadings . . . (2) if the validity of signatures is admitted or
proved and there is compliance with subsection (1) a
plaintiff producing the instrument is entitled to payment if
the plaintiff proves entitlement to enforcement under section
70A-3-301, unless the defendant proves a defense or claim
in recoupment [Emphasis added.]
The above-cited section was interpreted by the Utah Supreme Court to
define a plaintiff's prima facie case on a negotiable instrument. "It is not disputed that
the introduction of the check, admittedly executed and issued by the defendant, made
a prima facie case of its genuineness . . . consequently, the burden of establishing his
defense to the contrary shifted to the defendant." lager & Branch. Inc. v. Paooas. 433
P.2d 605, 606 (Utah 1967).
As a result, Herwit's defense of conditional delivery/delivery for a
specific purpose, is a matter outside of Bank One's prima facie case and should have
been raised as an affirmative defense. Not having been raised by way of an answer it
is waived and cannot be raised by an affidavit filed in opposition to a motion for
summary judgment. Therefore, this defense was properly rejected by the trial court.
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The result is the same for Herwit's belated allegation of lack of
consideration. In Vallev Bank & Trust Co. v. Wilken. 668 P.2d 493 (Utah 1983), the Utah
Supreme Court was faced with a case in which a defendant attempted to raise the
affirmative defense of lack of consideration by affidavit filed in opposition to a motion
for summary judgment. This argument was rejected by the Utah Supreme Court which
stated:
Appellant's sole contention is that the trial court erred in
granting summary judgment because her husband's
affidavit had raised the defense of failure of consideration.
The difficulty with her argument is that she was obligated to
raise that defense in her answer to the complaint. She
made only a general denial in her answer and did not raise
any affirmative defenses. Failure of consideration is an
affirmative defense and must be treated as such.. . . She
could not raise it by means of an affidavit in opposition to
summary judgment. It is not the office of an affidavit in
opposition to a motion for summary judgment to provide a
means of introducing defenses which have not been raised
by answer or by proper motion. [Emphasis added.]
Id at 493-94.
Further, Herwit's argument that there is a lack of consideration is
predicated on a parenthetical insertion in his brief (see p. 14) in which he alleges that
he tendered the check to Aristocrat Travel in order to purchase an equity position in
that corporation and that the corporation has subsequently gone bankrupt and that he
therefore never received anything of value for his money. There is absolutely nothing
in the record to support this alleged basis for failure of consideration. Thus, this
defense was not raised in opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment, and cannot
be raised on appeal for the first time. Further, since Aristocrat was indeed paid on the

00021377 .L96

29

instrument, Herwit did, in fact, pay for the equity position and arguably owns an equity
position in Aristocrat. Apparently Herwit's true argument is that the equity position he
bought no longer has any value, but the wisdom of Herwit's purchase is not a matter
that can be raised against Bank One.
Like the defendant in Valley Bank & Trust Co.. Herwit filed an answer
which constituted only a general denial and raised no affirmative defenses.
Consequently, these affirmative defenses cannot be raised through an affidavit filed in
opposition to a motion for summary judgment and are insufficient to create an issue of
material fact. Therefore, even if Bank One is a holder rather than an HDC, Bank One
remains able to enforce the Herwit's check and the trial court's decision is
supportable and should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
It is undisputed that Herwit is the drawer of a check made payable to
Aristocrat Travel. It is undisputed that Aristocrat Travel then negotiated the check to
Bank One and immediately obtained value therefore. It is undisputed that Bank One's
first notice that the instrument was drawn on insufficient funds came four to five days
later. Consequently, the trial court's decision granting summary judgment in Bank
One's favor is supportable as Bank One is entitled to the status of holder in due
course, thereby taking free of any of Herwit's alleged defenses.
Even if Bank One is a mere holder, Bank One is still entitled to enforce
the instrument subject to any properly raised defenses. No defenses were raised by
answer or subsequent motion. Again, the trial court did not err when it concluded, as
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answer or subsequent motion. Again, the trial court did not err when it concluded, as
a matter of law, that Bank One is entitled to summary judgment against Paul Herwit.
Finally, it should be remembered that the Herwit did not raise any
defenses by way of answer or subsequent motion. Herwit did not file any
memorandum in the lower court. Therefore, Herwit failed to preserve any of the issues
which he now attempts to argue to this Court. The present appeal is therefore
frivolous and interposed merely for delay, entitling Bank One to an award of its
attorney's fees on appeal under Rule 33(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure which
reads in relevant part as follows:
". . .[I]f the court determines that a motion made or appeal
taken under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it
shall award just damages, which may include single or
double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or reasonable
attorney's fees, to the prevailing party. The court may order
that the damages be paid by the party or the party's
attorney.
Wherefore, Bank One requests that this Court affirm the trial court's ruling and
award Bank One its attorney's fees and costs on appeal.
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ADDENDUM

Arnold Richer - 2751
Mark E. Medcalf - 5404
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C,
311 South State Street, Suite 280
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 53 9-8632
Attorneys for Plaintiff
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
ooOoo
BANK ONE, UTAH, National
Association, fka VALLEY BANK
AND TRUST COMPANY, National
Association,

AFFIDAVIT OF DEANNE FREEMAN
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,

Civil No. 950009179 CV

PAUL HERWIT,
Defendant.

Judge Hutchings
ooOoo

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF DAVIS

)
:ss .
)

I, Deanne Freeman, being first duly sworn depose and say as
follows:
1,

I am the Customer Service Manager of the Bountiful office

of Bank One, Utah.
2.

By virtue of my responsibilities in regard thereto I have

access to the records of Bank One, Utah as they pertain to the
negotiable instrument which is the subject matter of the present
action and transactions affecting the account of the payee thereon

Civil No. 950009179
Judge Hutchings

Aristocrat Travel and Cruises of Park City, Inc.
3.

Records produced herewith are maintained in the ordinary

course of business of Bank One, Utah.
4.

On May 25, 1995 check number 2526 drawn on the account of

Paul Herwit^ at First Security Bank was deposited to the account of
Aristocrat Travel and Cruises of Park City, Inc., account number
13477545, at Bank One, Utah.

A copy of check number 2526 is

attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by this
reference.
5.

On May 3 0 I contacted First Security Bank to inquire as

to whether check number 2526 had cleared First Security Bank.

I

was advised on May 30, 1995 that the check had been honored, and I
credited the payee's account accordingly.
6.
withdrew

After receiving credit for check number 2526 the payee
from

its account

the

funds

so credited.

Copies

of

relevant monthly statements are attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and
incorporated herein by this reference.
7.

On or about May 31, 1995 First Security Bank refused to

accept check number 2526 and refused to remit payment thereon.

The

instrument was returned due to insufficient funds and bearing the
notation "RTM" (refer to maker).

2
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8.

Paul Herwit is not a client of Bank One, Utah.

Prior to

honoring his check Bank One, Utah received no communication or
notice from Paul Herwit regarding check number 2526.
9.

Bank One, Utah is currently in possession of check number

2526.
Further affiant sayeth not.
DATED this ^ M ^ S i a y of August, 1995.

Deanne Freema
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN
Sigus-r
1995.

to before

me

this

cJ2<-f

day of

NOT.

Residing in
My Commission Expires

^-•r-96

3

j&cc^iSpsZ^

^ ^ ^
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the

£ I

day of August, 1995, I

caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be served upon
the following parties by placing the same in the United States
mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
H. Delbert Welker
Attorney for Defendant
3540 South 4000 West, #430
West Valley City, UT 84120

(AA.KA&<(•*yfii/iX

ban24650.doc
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BANKEONE.

ACCOUNT NUMBER
1547-7545

VALLEY BUSINESS CHECKING

285 10-19

BOUNTIFUL OFFICE
510 SOUTH 200 WEST
BOUNTIFUL, UTAH

00

84010

285

ARISTOCRAT TRAVEL ft CRUISES OF PARK
CITY INC
3330 S 700 E $ 112
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84106-1544

QUESTIONS? CALL:
481-5600

"ft-

ACCOUNT SUMMARY AS OF 05-31-95
-

BALANCE SUMMARY

BEGINNING BALANCE AS OF 04-28-95
PLUS
4 DEPOSITS/CREDITS
LESS
11 CHECKS/WITHDRAWALS
LESS SERVICE CHARGE
ENDING BALANCE AS OF 05-31-95

20,562.25
32,266.97
7.41

^

W

9.346.06-0#*'t^'

9,346.06-

LOW BALANCE

EARNINGS CREDIT SUMMARY AVERAGE COLLECTED BALANCE
X EARNINGS CREDIT FACTOR
< EARNINGS ALLOWANCE
- SERVICE
DEPOSITS
ITEMS DEPOSITED
MONTHLY MAINTENANCE

866.7700.4750X
.00

SERVICE CHARGE SUMMARY UNIT
NUMBER OF
PRICE
UNITS
0.250
3
0.040
4
6.50

CHARGE
FOR SERVICE
0.75
0.16
6.50
7.41
.00
7.41

SERVICE CHARGE TOTAL
EARNINGS ALLOWANCE
NET SERVICE CHARGE
DEPOSITS/CREDITS
AMOUNT
4.071.66
1,000.00

DATE
DESCRIPTION
5-11 DEPOSIT
5-18 DEPOSIT

l/ATE DESCRIPTION
05-25 DEPOSIT ^
05-30 MISCELLANEOUS CREDIT^

AMOUNT
9,000.00
,6.490.59

CHECKS/WITHDRAWALS
DESCRIPTION Of TRANSACTION
ARC SETTLEMENT
0503 46528565
ARC SETTLEMENT
0510 46528565
ARC SETTLEMENT
0517 46528565
ARC SETTLEMENT
0526 46528565
BANK ONE UTAH NA
0531
CHECK PRINTING
0526
BANK ONE UTAH NA
0531
AMOUNT
DATE
DESCRIPTION
DATE
DESCRIPTION
15.00
>5-10 OVERDRAFT CHECK CHARGE
05-26 OVERDRAFT CHECK CHARGE
)5-17 OVERDRAFT CHECK CHARGE
15.00
05-31 OVERDRAFT CHECK CHARGE
DATE
6-03
6-10
6-17
6-26
6-31
6-31
6-31

PED 042395
PED 043095
PED 050795
PED 051495
RETURN FEE
CHECK CHG
RTN ITM

0 ENCLOSURES
THANK

13 4 7 - 7 5 4 5

Y O U POP BANKING WITH BANK ONE

UTAH

NA

AMOUNT
2,221.30
4,171.66
724.61
16,071.40
2.00
16.00
9,000.00
AMOUNT
15.00
15.00

^

\N

ACCOUNT NUMBER
13*7-7545 m

VALLEY BUSINESS CHECKING

BOUNTUUL O f f ICE
5 1 0 SOUTH 2 0 0 WEST
BOUNTIFUL, UTAH

285 10-19
64010

00

ARISTOCRAT TRAVEL t CRUISES OF PARK
CITY INC
3330 S 700 E # 112
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84106-1544

285

QUESTIONS? CALL:
481-5600

ACCOUNT SUMMARY AS OF 0 6 - 3 0 - 9 5
BALANCE SUMMARY
BEGINNING BALANCE AS OF 0 5 - 3 1 - 9 5
PLUS
3 DEPOSITS/CREDITS
LESS
7 CHECKS/WITHDRAWALS
LESS SERVICE CHARGE
ENDING BALANCE AS OF 0 6 - 3 0 - 9 5

LOU BALANCE

9,346.66-,>.; -;
14,671.35
14,393.29
6.87
9,074.87-

12,550.50-

EARNINGS CREDIT SUMMARY
AVERAGE COLLECTED BALANCE
X EARNINGS CREDIT FACTOR
* EARNINGS ALLOWANCE
- SERVICE
DEPOSITS
ITEMS DEPOSITED
MONTHLY MAINTENANCE

<$p»**

10,252.1900.4750X
.00

SERVICE CHARGE SUMMARY NUMBER OF
UNIT
UNITS
PRICE
1
0.250
3
0.040
6.50

CHARGE
FOR SERVICE
0.25
0.12
6.50
6.87
.00
6.87

SERVICE CHARGE TOTAL
EARNINGS ALLOWANCE
NET SERVICE CHARGE
DEPOSITS/CREDITS
DATE
DESCRIPTION
06-02 MISCELLANEOUS CREDIT
06-06 MISCELLANEOUS CREDIT

AMOUNT
1,637.70
1,912.80

DATE
DESCRIPTION
06-08 DEPOSIT

AMOUNT
11,120.85

CHECKS/WITHDRAWALS
DATE
05-31 PED 052195
06-07 f>BO 052895
DATE
DESCRIPTION
05-31 OVERDRAFT CHECK CHARGE
06-07 OVERDRAFT CHECK CHARGE
06-14 RETURNED CHECK CHARGE

DESCRIPTION OF TRANSACTION
ARC SETTLEMENT
0531 4 6 5 2 8 5 6 5
ARC SETTLEMENT
0607 46528565
AMOUNT
15.00
17.00
17.00

DATE
DESCRIPTION
0 6 - 2 1 RETURNED CHECK CHARGE
0 6 - 2 8 RETURNED CHECK CHARGE

0 ENCLOSURES

THANK YOU PQR BANKING W « r H BANK
MEM6EP FDtC

0 17

1347-7545

ONE

UTAH

NA

AMOUNT
3,189.44
11,120.85
AMCUNT
17.00
17.00

BANK=ON£.

* ec wwi8 B

VALLEY BUSINESS CHECKING

285 10-19

BOUNTIFUL OFFICE
510 SOUTH 2 0 0 WEST
BOUNTIFUL, UTAH

00

84010

285

ARISTOCRAT TRAVEL % CRUISES OF PARK
CITY INC
3330 S 700 E 0 112
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84106-1544

QUESTIONS? CALL:

,r,0TACCOUNT SUMMARY AS OF 07-31-95
-

BALANCE SUMMARY

B E G I N N I N G BALANCE A S OF 06-30-95
PLUS
4 DEPOSITS/CREDITS
LESS
7 CHECKS/WITHDRAWALS
L E S S SERVICE CHARGE
ENDING BALANCE A S OF 07-31-95
LOW BALANCE

(Vu' \ir-

-

9,074.87-,
18,234.42
9,159.55
.00

.00

9,142.87DEPOSITS/CREDITS

DATE
DESCRIPTION
07-06 DEPOSIT
07-12 DEPOSIT

AMOUNT
3,854.93 vy
5,219.62

DATE
DESCRIPTION
07-26 MISCELLANEOUS CREDIT
07-31 OVERDRAFT CHARGE-OFF

AMOUNT
34.00
9,125.87

CHECKS/WITHDRAWALS
DATE
07-05 PED 062595
07-12 PED 070295
DATE
DESCRIPTION
07-05 OVERDRAFT CHECK CHARGE
07-11 RETURNED CHECK CHARGE
07-12 OVERDRAFT CHECK CHARGE
0 ENCLOSURES

17

134 7-7 54 5

DESCRIPTION OF TRANSACTION
ARC SETTLEMENT
0705 46528565
ARC SETTLEMENT
0712 46528565
AMOUNT
17.00
17.00
17.00

DATE
DESCRIPTION
07-19 RETURNED CHECK CHARGE
07-25 RETURNED CHECK CHARGE

AMOUNT
3,854.93
5,219.62
AMOUNT
17.00
17.00

